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Hiero a.k.a Tyrannicus
by Xenophon
(430-354 BC)
Part 10
Simonides' counsel, cont.
(1) And Hiero said, "Well, Simonides, you seem to me to speak well as far as these matters go; but have you anything to say regarding the mercenaries, so that I may not incur hatred because of them? Or do you mean that once a ruler wins friendship he will no longer need a bodyguard at all?" [a]
[a. While Xenophon is putting words into the mouth of the poet Simonides (in a dialog that took place about 40 years before Xenophon's birth), the author is writing from his own perspective as a renown commander of mercenaries.]
(2) "By Zeus, certainly he will need it," said Simonides. "For I know that it is inbred in some human beings, just as in horses, to be insolent in proportion as the needs they have are more fully satisfied.
(3) "The fear inspired by the bodyguard would make such men more moderate. And as for the gentlemen, there is nothing, it seems to me, by means of which you would confer so great services on them as by the mercenaries.
(4) "For surely you support them as guards for yourself; but before now many masters have died violently at the hands of their slaves. If, then, one—and this the first—of the mercenaries' orders should be, that as the bodyguard of all the citizens they were, whenever they perceived a thing of this kind, to go to the aid of all—and if they were ordered to guard against the evil-doers we all know arise in cities—the citizens would know they were helped by them.
(5) "In addition to this, these [mercenaries] would probably best be able to provide confidence and safety for the husband-men and property of herds and flocks in the country, alike for your own privately and for those throughout the country. They are capable, moreover, of providing the citizens with leisure to concern themselves with their private property, by guarding the positions of advantage.
(6) "Furthermore, as regards the secret and surprise attacks of enemies: Who would be readier either to perceive them in advance or to prevent them, than those who are always under arms and disciplined? Surely on a campaign, what is more useful to citizens than mercenaries? For [mercenaries] are likely to be readier to toil, run risks, and stand guard for the citizens.
(7) "As for the neighboring cities, is there not a necessity, brought about by those who are constantly under arms, for them especially to desire peace? For being disciplined the mercenaries would best be able to preserve what belongs to their friends and to destroy what belongs to their enemies. Surely when the citizens realize that these mercenaries do no harm at all to one who commits no injustice; that they restrain those who wish to do evil; that they come to the aid of those who are unjustly wronged; and that they take counsel for and incur danger in behalf of the citizens—must they not necessarily spend very gladly for their upkeep? After all, men support guards privately, and for lesser objects than these."